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Abstract 
 
Currently network security of institutions highly 
depend on firewalls, which are used to separate 
untrusted network from trusted one by enforcing 
security policies. Security policies used in firewalls are 
ordered set of rules where each rule is represented as 
a predicate and an action. This paper proposes 
modeling of firewall rules via directed acyclic graphs 
(DAG), from which test cases can be automatically 
generated for firewall testing. The approach proposed 
follows test case generation algorithm developed for 
event sequence graphs. Under a local area network 
setup with the aid of a specifically developed software 
for this purpose, generated test cases are converted to 
network test packets, test packets are sent to the 
firewall under test (FUT), and sent packets are 
compared with passed packets to determine test result. 
Keywords: Firewalls, Firewall Policies, Directed 
Acyclic Graphs, Event Sequence Graphs, Firewall 
Testing, Security Testing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Firewalls, which act as the most important defense 
mechanism of network security, have to be tested to 
validate that they work as specified. The firewall 
specification is mainly composed of intended security 
policy and allowed network protocols, which are 
usually the main focus of an attacker. The intended 
security policy consists of firewall rules, which 
configure the firewall behavior, and allowed network 
protocols. These constitute an important part of 
firewall’s internal infrastructure which can be 
described as packet capture, decision making on the 
packet under consideration, and packet release. 
Decision making operation is carried out with respect 
to firewall policy and network protocols. The security 
policy is external to the firewall like a configuration 
file, whereas packet checking with respect to network 
protocols is implemented in the firewall software. 
Since the firewall policy is considered as a 
specification and can be represented by a formal 
model, we propose a model-based testing approach for 
firewalls. The novelty of this approach is using DAG 
model for firewall testing. This paper proposes 
modeling of firewall rules and generating test cases 
using DAGs. Since event sequence graphs (ESG) are 
directed graphs, we applied its test case generation 
algorithm to the DAG representation of firewall rules. 
Then test packets derived from generated test cases are 
sent to the firewall to analyze its behavior. 
Next section summarizes related work before 
Section 3 outlines background and the test generation 
algorithm. The core of the paper, Section 4, presents 
our firewall testing approach. Sections 5 and 6 include 
implementation details of the approach and a case 
study on a firewall. Section 7 concludes the paper and 
outlines our research work planned. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
A firewall controls network traffic to and from a 
computer, based on a security policy. Although 
systematic testing was an omitted area in firewall 
studies and relative literature, recent studies on 
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firewalls began to fill this gap. Recent work about 
firewalls mention how firewalls suffer due to design 
[1] and configuration problems [2, 3, 4]. Including [1] 
some approaches propose using formal languages to 
specify firewall rules [5, 6]. In contrast to formal 
languages defined, the structural testing approach 
stated in [13], does not consider the rule sequence in 
firewalls but aims to evaluate firewall by three aspects; 
namely consistency, completeness, compactness. 
In some cases, firewalls are undertaken by points of 
design, implementation, and configuration, other 
approaches focus on the analysis of firewalls with 
anomaly detection by Ehab Al-Shaer and Hazem 
Hamed in [14]. They also offer an algorithm to 
discover and detect anomalies. Frantzen, Kerschbaum, 
Schultz and Fahmi in [9] proposed that given the large 
number of firewall vulnerabilities that have surfaced in 
recent years, it is important to develop a 
comprehensive framework for understanding both what 
firewalls actually do when they receive incoming 
traffic and what can go wrong when they process this 
traffic. They used dataflow model of firewall internals 
to study vulnerabilities in firewalls. 
The studies based on data flow testing [7,8,10,11] 
have been restricted to testing data dependencies that 
exist within a procedure which requires information 
about the flow of data including calls and returns 
across procedure boundaries. Intra-procedural data 
flow tests focus on source code by building and 
searching program’s def-use graph and determine the 
dependencies or definition use pairs. Although existed 
inter-procedural data flow algorithms cannot provide 
information about locations of definitions needed for 
inter-procedural data flow testing, they help in 
determining the def-use information and guiding 
selection as well as execution of test cases that meet 
requirements [12]. 
Fulp proposes a DAG approach for representing 
firewall rules in [15], which focuses on the precedence 
of the rule sequences and reorder rules to improve 
performance by decreasing packet delay. Also in [16], 
it is proven that by the approach of DAG the linear 
sorting of a firewall policy provides an integrity. Our 
approach follows formal representation of firewall 
rules with DAG and builds on test case generation 
algorithm developed for ESG.  
 
3. Background 
 
The firewall policy rules are required to be modeled 
by a formal specification tool. To represent legal and 
illegal statements better, a graph-based approach is 
constituted. In the graph-based representation of a 
firewall policy, cycles should be avoided. Otherwise, 
anomalies may occur. The directed acyclic graph 
representation of firewall rules fulfills these 
requirements. 
 
3.1 Directed Acyclic Graphs 
 
DAG is a directed graph with no directed circuits. 
For any vertex v, there is no nonempty directed path 
that starts and ends on v [19]. The simplest example of 
a DAG can be given as a directed tree. The vertices of 
an n-vertex acyclic directed graph G can be labeled 
with integers from the set {1, 2, ..., n} such that the 
presence of the edge (i,j) in G implies that i<j where 
the edge (i,j) is directed from vertex i to vertex j [20]. 
A partial order is formed by the reach ability 
relation in a DAG. DAGs are mainly used to model 
processes where the flow of information moves in a 
consistent direction [19]. In our case, we use DAG to 
represent the firewall policy rules as a rule (evaluation) 
sequence graph, from which test cases are generated 
using test case generation algorithm developed for 
event sequence graphs. 
 
3.2 Event Sequence Graphs 
 
The testing process consists of the execution of the 
SUT with the produced test inputs and the comparison 
of the real outputs with the expected ones. If the 
outputs are in compliance with the expected ones, the 
test is said to have succeeded, else it fails. 
Event sequence graph is an event-based formal 
model, where the inputs and events are merged and 
assigned to the vertices of an event transition diagram. 
The arcs visualize the sequence relation of the events 
[17]. An ESG is a simple albeit powerful formalism for 
capturing the behavior of interactive systems. The 
complete set of interactions is captured in terms of a 
set of ESGs, where each ESG represents a possibly 
infinite set of event sequences. An event can be a user 
stimulus or a system response, punctuating different 
stages of the system activity. 
As stated in [18], each edge in the ESG is marked as 
a legal event pair (EP). A complete event sequence 
(CES) represents a walk through the ESG by starting at 
the entry node and ending at the exit node of the ESG. 
Entry and exit nodes are not events, they represent 
entry and exit points of an ESG. Faulty (or illegal) 
event pairs (FEP) are introduced as the edges of the 
corresponding ESG . Moreover, an EP of the ESG can 
be extended to a faulty, or an illegal, event triple 
(FETr) by adding a subsequent FEP to this EP. A 
faulty event sequence (FES) of the length n consists of 
n-1 events that form a legal ES of length n-2 and of 
two events at the end that form an FEP. 
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As stated in [18], faulty CESs (FCESs) can be 
constructed using FEPs. A FEP that starts at the entry 
node of the ESG is also a FCES. Furthermore, a FEP is 
not executable when it does not start at the entry of the 
ESG. Hence, it is extended by adding suitable prefixes 
and the resulting sequence becomes a FCES. Each ES 
that starts at the entry of the ESG and ends at the first 
symbol of the FEP is prefixed to the FEP and the 
resulting sequence becomes a FCES. 
 
3.3 Test Case Generation 
 
We use the method described in [18] which uses an 
ESG and its complement as input and generates a test 
set that is complete with respect to model-based 
coverage criterion. There are mainly two objectives for 
the test case generation procedure. One is the 
generation of CESs and the other one is to generate 
FCESs from the complement of ESG that model the 
system behavior by considering both the desirable and 
undesirable parts. With the input of a FCES, the SUT 
is expected to go to a faulty state and raise a related 
exception handling mechanism. Hence, CESs are used 
to test the correct behavior, where the FCESs are used 
to check the exception handling mechanism. 
Given an ESG and the corresponding CESG, the 
test case generation algorithm generates tests that cover 
both all event pairs in ESG and all faulty event pairs of 
the CESG. Note that, the sum of the lengths of the 
generated CESs and FCESs should be minimal to 
avoid long chain of events. The test case generation 
algorithm [18] is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Test case generation algorithm [18] 
 
4. Firewall Testing Approach 
 
The firewall testing approach proposed here is 
composed of five phases: (1) generating test cases from 
firewall policy rules, (2) constructing network test 
packets from generated test cases, (3) sending 
constructed test packets to FUT, (4) capturing packets 
that go through the FUT, and (5) comparing sent and 
captured packets to determine the test result. Proposed 
firewall testing approach is summarized in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of the approach 
 
The firewall policy parser algorithm explained in 
[15] is used to convert rules to a DAG and then each 
rule sequence in the DAG is considered as an event 
sequence, so that test case generation algorithm for 
ESG can be utilized. At the test case generation step, 
the algorithm creates a test case for each complete 
event (rule) sequence, which are derived from the 
DAG. 
The test case generation algorithm works as 
follows: for each complete event sequence, a test case 
is generated from the first rule of that CES and this test 
case is modified by the proceeding events (rules) in the 
CES until the “deny all” rule, which is always the last 
rule for all firewall policies that follows default deny 
principle. An example of test case generation is given 
in Section 6. 
 Once concrete test cases are ready, constructing 
network test packets as well as sending and capturing 
them require an appropriate network architecture and 
some network programming. Our firewall testing tool 
explained in Section 5 contains the necessary network 
programming code. To be able to analyze and evaluate 
the behavior of the firewall under test with respect to 
test cases, we use an architecture introduced in [23], 
which is  illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Firewall evaluator architecture [23] 
 
The test packets will be released from packet 
injection point (PIP), which is the computer that hosts 
our firewall testing tool. All the traffic entering and 
leaving the firewall will be recorded and collected data 
will be analyzed to obtain test outputs, which will be 
compared with expected outputs to determine test 
result. We expect to see allowed packets at the packet 
leaving point but not the denied ones. 
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 Figure 4. Firewall testing tool graphical user interface screenshot 
 
5. Implementation and Tool Support 
 
For the implementation of our approach, we 
developed a firewall testing tool in Java programming 
language. The tool reads all rules from a firewall 
policy and derives test cases from these rules. Then 
using generated test cases test packets are constructed 
using JPCAP v0.7 [24] library. Our tool also includes a 
sniffer to collect packets that pass the FUT. 
The generated packets are stored in a database table 
where MYSQL v5.1 [21] is used as the database 
management system. The generated packets are sent to 
the firewall, where IPTABLES v1.4.1.1 [22] is used 
running under Linux operating system. The packets 
which pass through the firewall are captured and stored 
in another table. Both sent and captured packets are 
compared to determine whether the test is passed or 
failed. Firewall test results can be seen in the graphical 
user interface of our tool illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
6. Case Study 
 
The case study was conducted by using an example 
firewall policy displayed in Table 1. The rules are 
converted to a DAG and then to an ESG. The ESG 
model of the example firewall rules is given in Figure 
5. It can be seen in the figure that the node r7 subsumes 
r1, r6 subsumes r2, r3, r4 and r5 and r8 subsumes r6, r7. 
Test generation begins with an analysis of the rules 
and the subsume relation between them. This analysis 
leads to the following set of EPs. 
(r1, r7), (r2, r6), (r3, r6), (r4, r6), (r5, r6), (r6, r8), (r7, r8) 
 
Table 1. Example firewall rules 
 
 
In the next step, CESs are generated. As explained 
in (Section 3.2), CES is a walk-through obtained by 
extending the EPs by appropriate suffixes. The list 
below gives the CESs for rules given in Table 1. 
(r1, r7, r8), (r2, r6, r8), (r3, r6, r8), (r4, r6, r8), (r5, r6, r8) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. ESG model of the firewall policy 
showing legal rule sequences 
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For each complete event (rule) sequence, a test case 
is generated and then converted to a network test 
packet. In other words, an individual packet represents 
a unique test case. For instance, consider the first CES, 
which is the rule sequence (r1, r7, r8) as shown in Table 
2. For this complete sequence, a network test packet is 
generated with 192.168.2.127 as source IP addresses, 
with 53 as source port, with 10.0.0.127 as destination 
IP address, and with 53 as destination port. Table 2 
shows generated test packets for each complete event 
(rule) sequence defined in Table 1 and presents the 
state of the packets and respectively the test result. In 
this study, we did not consider FEPs, so  FCESs and 
they are left as future work. 
 
Table 2. Sent and captured packets 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we proposed a solution for model-
based firewall testing and presented a case study to 
explain the proposed approach. Using directed acyclic 
graphs to model firewall rules and utilizing test case 
generation algorithm of event sequence graphs, we are 
able to automate firewall testing procedure. This 
automation is realized with an implemented tool. As 
future work, we would like to extend our case study by 
including faulty rule sequences. In the proposed 
approach, we utilized only concrete test cases, however 
we would like to integrate the concept of abstract test 
cases as in [25] to our work. The test case generation 
utility of the introduced tool can be improved by 
reflecting hacker methodologies. 
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